Evol Ecol Res 6: 627-630 (2004) Full PDF if your library subscribes.
Shrimp equalize marginal payoffs in an evolutionary game with condition dependence
Eric L. Charnov
Department of Biology, The University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM 87131-0001, USA
Sex-changing shrimp support the marginal value rule from evolutionary game theory in their facultative adjustment of sex ratio.
Keywords: condition-dependent ESS, frequency distribution, game theory, sex allocation.
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