Evol Ecol Res 9: 1023-1041 (2007) Full PDF if your library subscribes.
Cooperation maintained by fitness adjustment
Christine Taylor,1 Janet Chen2 and Yoh Iwasa3*
1Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology and 2Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA and 3Department of Biology, Faculty of Sciences, Kyushu University, Fukuoka 812-8581, Japan
Author to whom all correspondence should be addressed.
Questions: Can cooperation be enhanced if players whose performance is higher than the mean are forced to pay an additional cost in each generation?
Mathematical methods: Analysis of replicator dynamics with mutation. The ESS distribution of cooperation level is obtained.
Key assumptions: Players engage in a cooperative dilemma game, and at the end of each generation those whose performance is higher than the mean are forced to pay an additional cost.
Conclusions: Without mutation, the entire population eventually conforms to a single cooperation level determined by the initial composition of the population. With mutation, there is an equilibrium distribution of cooperation, which has a peak at an intermediate level of cooperation. Whether it is institutionalized such as tax or just a social custom, fitness adjustment based ultimately on people’s ‘envy’ is able to maintain cooperation.
Keywords: distribution of cooperation level, envy, evolution of cooperation, fitness adjustment, punishment.
DOWNLOAD A FREE, FULL PDF COPY
IF you are connected using the IP of a subscribing institution (library, laboratory, etc.)
or through its VPN.
© 2007 Yoh Iwasa. All EER articles are copyrighted by their authors. All authors endorse, permit and license Evolutionary Ecology Ltd. to grant its subscribing institutions/libraries the copying privileges specified below without additional consideration or payment to them or to Evolutionary Ecology, Ltd. These endorsements, in writing, are on file in the office of Evolutionary Ecology, Ltd. Consult authors for permission to use any portion of their work in derivative works, compilations or to distribute their work in any commercial manner.
Subscribing institutions/libraries may grant individuals the privilege of making a single copy of an EER article for non-commercial educational or non-commercial research purposes. Subscribing institutions/libraries may also use articles for non-commercial educational purposes by making any number of copies for course packs or course reserve collections. Subscribing institutions/libraries may also loan single copies of articles to non-commercial libraries for educational purposes.
All copies of abstracts and articles must preserve their copyright notice without modification.